THE BURDEN OF THE MEXICAN PAST: The Mexican Revolution
presented to the Raleigh Tavern Philosophical Society,
Tomball, TX, USA on November 7, 2002 by
Clifton R. Fox
Professor of History
Tomball College
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the government and
people of the United States have paid increasing to relations with Mexico. Mexico is not only the neighbor of the
United States, and the largest source country of illegal immigration into the
U.S., but Mexico has also recently outstripped Japan to become the second
largest trading partner of the United States in overall volume of trade,
exceeded only by Canada. Mexico is
second in both imports and exports, and it is fifth in the balance of trade
deficit behind China, Japan, Canada and Germany. The growing trade relationship has been bolstered by the legal
relationship embodied by NAFTA.
On October 7, 1992, United States
President George W. H. Bush, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney signed the North American Free Trade
Agreement [NAFTA] in San Antonio. NAFTA
entered into force after ratification on January 1, 1994. The upshot of these
legal agreements and the formation of a regional trade bloc is that the United
States in its domestic arrangements will be bound more and more by
international agreements and executive decisions rather than by acts of
Congress in areas such as business, labor and environmental regulation, as well
as border control and immigration. This
is a direct consequence of the “supremacy clause” in the United States
Constitution. When trade agreements are
signed with Mexico and other countries, they contain provisions which will
operate as statutory law inside the United States without normal Congressional
enactment. This is particularly
interesting in light of the undertaking to launch a Free Trade Area of the
Americas [FTAA] in 2004.
The growing legal partnership with
Mexico is a reality, but what kind of partner will Mexico be? For example, on the day NAFTA came into
force, the Zapatista rebels revolted in Chiapas, and Mexico soon experienced
one of her periodic peso crises.
President Salinas, as it emerged, had “cooked the books” to create an
illusion of prosperity. The new
president, Ernesto
Zedillo Ponce de Leon, was left to face the mess. Had President Bush been flim-flammed in the
NAFTA negotiations by Salinas? The
whole truth of this will probably remain elusive; Salinas now lives in Spain to
evade prosecution in Mexico on a variety of corruption charges, as well as possible
conspiracy to murder charge related to the deaths of two senior political figures.
However, the Salinas affair is only
the tip of the iceberg in understanding the realities of Mexico. The reality of Mexico, like the reality of
every nation, is a product of its history.
Mexico’s history is full of turbulent eras which have left their mark on
the country. This essay explores the
Mexican Revolution which exploded in 1911, and whose echoes have not died
away. Even if the Mexican Revolution
had no implications for policy, it would still be a story very much worth
telling.
DESCENT
INTO CHAOS
At the opening of the twentieth
century, Mexico was a country which be seen in one of two ways: either Mexico
was a poor country advancing slowly but surely towards modernity with the help
of an experienced government and intrepid foreign investors, or else Mexico was
a country which languished under an iron-fisted and corrupt dictator who sold
out his people to rapacious exploiters, both domestic and foreign, and did
little for their happiness and well-being.
Both versions of reality were partly of the truth, and it was central to
both versions of the truth that Mexico’s stability depended on one man,
President Porfirio Diaz, who celebrated his 70th birthday in 1900. With Diaz, our story begins.
The
Times of Porfirio Diaz
Porfirio Diaz was born in
1830. His home state was Oaxaca, and
Diaz trained as a lawyer under Oaxaca’s favorite son, Benito Juarez. Juarez trained Diaz in law, and filled Diaz’s
mind with the heady brew of Juarez’s Liberal ideals. Juarez’s brand of 19th century Liberalism envisioned Mexico’s
entrance into the modern world as possible only when the political and social
power of the landholding aristocracy, the hacendados, and the Catholic Church
had been broken. Like many people in
the 19th century Catholic world, Juarez and Diaz were anti-clerical in opposing
the political and social power of the Church, but Diaz [unlike Juarez] was
never hostile to the Catholic faith as such.
Diaz followed Juarez in the
struggle to make Mexico a Liberal society. moving from the courthouse to the
battlefield when the need arose. Diaz
fought in Juarez’s Liberal forces in the civil war with the Conservatives, the
conflict known as the War of Reform [1857-1861]. He also fought against the
French intervention in Mexico [1862-1864] and the Mexican Empire of Maximilian
[1864-1867]. Memorably, Brigadier General Porfirio Diaz commanded the Mexican
right wing at the Battle of Puebla on May 5, 1862 [Cinco de Mayo].
The defeat of Maximilian in 1867
did not bring tranquility to Mexico or Diaz.
Porfirio Diaz did resign his army commission and return to Oaxaca, but
he soon became concerned that Juarez had become a dictator. Diaz was a rebel in arms against his only
mentor at the time of Juarez’s death.
He was even less happy with Juarez’s successor, Sebastian Lerdo, a
radical anti-clericalist. Unexpectedly,
Diaz found himself cast in the new role of de facto Conservative,
especially as defender of the Church.
In 1876, Diaz rose up in armed rebellion, drove Lerdo from power and
arranged his own election. Like Lerdo,
Diaz pledged “no re-election” – a pledge that he surprisingly kept in
1880. Diaz recruited his close friend
Manuel Gonzalez to run for president, and assured Gonzalez’s victory, but Diaz
had lived up to his pledge of “no re-election” – at least no consecutive
re-election.
However, Diaz concluded that only
he himself could lead Mexico. In 1884,
Diaz succeeded Gonzalez in the presidency.
The “no re-election” pledge was forgotten. Diaz was elected again in 1888, 1892, 1896, 1900 and 1904. Before the 1904 election, Diaz had altered
the Constitution to give himself a six year term; he would not run again until
1910. His control of the political
system seemed complete. Diaz had
brought stability to Mexico, a stability unknown since the birth of the
Republic. Stability had attracted
American and other foreign investment: railroads were built, mines operated,
commerce flourished. Diaz placed great
hope in these developments pointing the way to the future. In this sense, Diaz was a man of his time
touched by the same currents of thoughts which rippled through Washington,
London and Paris.
Unfortunately, the great majority
of Mexicans were poor agricultural workers, campesinos, who still lived under
the thumb of the hacendados, often in peonage.
The changes in which Diaz placed such hope meant little or nothing to
these people. If anything, the poor
seemed oppressed more than ever as the cultural and social world of their
masters, the hacendados, grew more modern and more capitalistic. The hacendados expected more profit from
their lands and more work from their campesinos. The campesinos could not read, and were untouched by the ideas
and the dreams which meant so much to the educated. Indeed, many campesinos could not even speak Spanish. In Diaz’s Mexico, languages such as Nahautl
and Zapotec remained the primary languages of millions of people.
Outbreak
of Revolution
Early in February 1908, Diaz
announced that he would not run in 1910.
He would retire at the age of 80.
In 1910, Diaz changed his mind and ran another term anyway. Very likely his announcement of 1908 had
been a ploy designed to flush out his enemies into the open. One of his enemies was Francisco
Madero. Francisco Indalecio Madero,
born in 1873, was the son of one of Mexico’s richest families. He had been educated in the United States
and Paris, and then returned to his hometown of Parras de la Fuente in the state of Coahuila. Madero was no radical, but resembled an
American progressive of his era: he wanted honest elections and mass
participation in politics, but he wanted no reforms that would interfere with
property or development. Indeed, Madero
believed democracy to be the only way to prevent social revolution. All this he said in his book La Sucesión Presidencial en 1910 [published in 1908].
When Diaz “changed his mind” and ran in 1910, he decided to permit only
one candidate to challenge him. He
selected Madero for this dubious honor, no doubt because Madero seemed to offer
no real danger of spreading radical ideas.
The election was conducted in the ordinary Mexican style -- rigged.
In the end, Congress declared Diaz re-elected. However, beneath the surface the ground was shifting. The coincidence in time with economic
problems played a role. Every force of
opposition to Diaz looked to Madero for leadership, intellectual and peasants,
businessmen and workers. Everyone saw
in Madero what they wanted to see; every group invented his own Madero. Above all, campesino rebels misplaced in
Madero their own dreams of social revolution, their dream of controlling the
land they farmed.
Madero himself had concluded that only an armed uprising could get rid
of Diaz. On October 7, 1910 – after his
defeat had been certified by Congress – Madero crossed into Texas at
Laredo. In San Antonio, Madero composed
a manifesto known as the Plan of San Luis Potosi which called for armed
rebellion on November 20. On the
appointed day and in the weeks that followed, rebel bands assembled in every
state of Mexico against Diaz. In many
places, troops and police suppressed riots and rebels with considerable
bloodshed, but the resource of the government were actually quite limited. Rebels could not be dislodged from
mountainous or remote areas; they could not be prevented from cutting roads and
isolating cities. While Federal troops
could maintain order in the cities, they had limited range outside the cities
in most of the country.
The resistance of Diaz’s forces was also undermined by Diaz’s advanced
age and poor health. Diaz could not
last much longer in power or in life.
Why risk life or career for him?
If Madero became president, would it really make any difference? How many officials and commanders really had
a stake in the Diaz regime? Some did
have a personal stake, of course. For
example, Porfirio Diaz’s nephew Felix Diaz was police chief of Mexico City. He aspired to succeed his uncle in power,
but Felix Diaz was an exception. The
Maderista forces had their greatest success in the state of Chihuahua. Local
fighters under leaders including Francisco [Pancho] Villa had blockaded the
Federal army in Chihuahua in Juarez, opposite El Paso by early 1911, On May 10,
1911, the Federal troops in Juarez surrendered.
On May 21, Madero met with Federal
government representatives in Juarez.
Four days later, Diaz left Mexico City.
He died in Paris in 1915. Madero
won the presidential election, and he took the oath of office on November 6,
1911. He hoped to settle the country,
to disarm the men with guns and pacify the country. Madero had wanted democracy, not revolution, but the men who had
taken up the gun in Madero’s name wanted massive changes which Madero himself
would never accept. They would not put
the gun done again for many years.
Madero had groped in the dark, and he had uncorked the wrong
bottle. Madero, who opposed revolution,
had uncorked the bottle of revolution, and Mexico would drink every drop.
The
Presidency of Francisco Madero
The problems facing Madero were
clear even before he had taken the oath of office. After arriving in Mexico City, Madero had a meeting with
Emiliano Zapata, the peasant rebel leader from the state of Morelos. In his meeting with Madero, Zapata proposed a
plan for massive land reform to free the campesinos from the domination of the
hacendados. At the same time, Zapata
rejected the idea of individual land ownership. He wanted the land divided into village communes under collective
ownership. Zapata’s scheme was exactly
the kind of social revolution that Madero opposed, and Madero made this clear
to Zapata. He demanded that Zapata
disarm his men and send them home. Had
Madero been a less honest man, he would have deceived Zapata with promises to
be forgotten later.
Elsewhere in Mexico, rebels who had
supported Madero did not turn against Madero as violently as Zapata, but they
did not disarm either. A case in point
was Francisco Villa of Chihuahua.
Villa, like Zapata, had goals of social revolution beyond Madero’s
interest, but Villa’s ideal was not communualism [like Zapata], but a Mexico of
small farmers and entrepreneurs. When
Madero took power, Villa concluded the Madero would be outwitted by wily Mexico
City politicians, bureaucrats and generals.
For Villa, Madero was an icon, but an innocent who would be fleeced by
city slickers. Therefore, Villa
determined to continue his fight on the local level against the hacendados and
Federal troops.
Other important Maderista
commanders in the northern states were Alvaro Obregon of Sonora and Venustiano
Carranza of Coahuila, Madero’s own home state.
Like Zapata and Villa, these represented forces that Madero could not
control. Nor could Madero trust the
regular army that he had inherited from Diaz.
In particular, General Victoriano Huerta was not a good man to
trust. He appeared to serve Madero
after Madero assumed the presidency, but Huerta turned against Madero, and
started to plot Madero’s overthrow after Madero started to inquire into
Huerta’s creative financial management of the army budget.
In February 1913, Felix Diaz,
Porfirio Diaz’s nephew, led troops loyal to his family in an attack on Mexico
City remembered as the Decena Tragica [Ten Tragic Days]. On February 18, 1913, Diaz and General Victoriano
Huerta met in the office of the United States to Mexico City, Henry Lane Wilson
[representing the administration of William Howard Taft, who would be leaving
office in a few weeks]. Diaz and
Huerta, with Ambassador Wilson’s blessing, agreed to remove Madero from
power. The role of Wilson in “Pact of
the Embassy” was critical. Taft had
opposed Madero’s revolution of 1910-1911, and he had been frustrated by
Madero’s extensive employment of Texas as a base of operations. However, given the weakness of Federal law
at the time, and the predominance of progressive Democrats in Texas [Gov. Thomas M. Campbell], Madero had had
little difficulty in making use of Texas territory. For example, The United States Border Patrol did not yet
exist. The Texas Rangers, answerable to
the State of Texas alone, patrolled the border.
In any case, Huerta acted swiftly
after his deal with Felix Diaz. Madero,
who did not suspect Huerta’s treachery, was arrested and shot. Huerta then summoned the Mexican Congress into
session that evening. Congress
rubber-stamped quickly Huerta’s ascent to the presidency. Huerta quickly double-crossed Diaz. Felix Diaz was denied any role in new
government. Huerta had needed Diaz in
his own bid for power, but then marginalized him. In October 1913, Diaz fled to the United States.
The
Presidency of Victoriano Huerta
Huerta faced opposition throughout
the country. Within weeks of Madero’s
murder , on March 26, Venustiano Carranza of Coahuila, Francisco Villa of Chihuahua and Alvaro
Obregon of Sonora signed the Plan of Guadalupe vowing to drive Huerta from
power. They dubbed themselves
Constitutionalists. Carranza titled
himself “First Chief of the Revolution” as Madero’s political heir. Carranza established a military commander
structure with his own lieutenant Pablo Gonzalez, Obregon and Villa as division commanders in the Northeast, the
Northwest, the North respectively.
Carranza also made overtures to Emiliano Zapata, recognizing Zapata as
commander of the Liberating Army of the South, although Zapata did not trust
Carranza as he had not trusted Madero, and he would not sign the Plan of
Guadalupe or acknowledge Carranza as First Chief. Nonetheless, Zapata fought Huerta. Huerta faced armed opposition on every hand.
Huerta also faced opposition from
the United States. Woodrow Wilson
became President of the United States on March 4, 1913. He had admired Madero, and was furious with
the conduct of Ambassador Wilson [no relation]. President Wilson ordered Ambassador Wilson home and closed the
American Embassy in Mexico City. Wilson
dispatched American forces to take steps against Huerta. In April 1914, a United States Navy task
force under Admiral Frank F. Fletcher occupied the port of Veracruz, and a U.S.
Army brigade under General Frederick Funston occupied the port city. This action prevented Huerta from receiving
shipments of modern arms that he had ordered from Europe, and also denied
Huerta the customs revenue from Mexico’s largest port.
President Wilson’s occupation finally
forced the resignation of Huerta in July 1914, but the occupation of Veracruz
almost backfired. Patriotic Mexicans,
furious at American intervention, actually rallied around Huerta. The Constitutionalists were forced to issue
ringing denunciations of American actions even as Carranza and Villa both
availed themselves of back channels to communicate to Wilson that they actually
approved. Huerta fled to Europe, and
later to the United States; he died in El Paso. Mexico found itself with no legitimate government. The country was in chaos, divided among
military chieftains.
Carranza managed to move his troops
into Mexico City, and gain control of the facilities of the central
government. On August 20, 1914,
Carranza declared himself provisional president. Villa and Obregon refused to recognize Carranza as
president. The two joined with Zapata
to demand the meeting of a Revolutionary Convention representing all the fighting
forces to form a new government, and later a new constitution. With Villa and Obregon both against him,
Carranza saw no choice but to accept the idea of a Revolutionary Convention, to
meet at Aguascalientes, more than 300 miles northwest of Mexico City.
The Convention of Aguascalientes
presented the possibly of ending Mexico’s strife and bringing peace, but it was
a possibility not easy to realize.
Mexico had descended into chaos, and could not easily climb out
again. The human toll of the conflict began
to mount. Rebel armies were often
undisciplined, more bandits than soldiers; they looted, murdered and raped with
abandon. Commanders often turned a
blind to horrendous atrocities, particularly when they lacked any other way to
“pay” their troops. Boys and men were
conscripted against their will, and rebel commanders collected “taxes” from
landowners and business. Estimates of
death are difficult to make. In
addition to violent death brought by war and chaos, one needs to count the
deaths from disease, famine and lack of medical care. In a poor land where disease, famine and lack of medical care is
rampant, one can only estimate the statistics of “excess” death. In all, two million dead is a likely figure.
IN
SEARCH OF ORDER: 1914-1928
The Convention of Aguascalientes
failed achieving the goal of peace. The
men who met there had no interest in its success – no interest in a viable
government that would strip themselves of their own powers. Mexico still faced the terrible face of war,
with the prospect of the nation becoming pounded together by a strongmen. Three strongmen ruled in succession:
Carranza, Obregon and then, Obregon’s fellow Sonoran Plutarco Calles. Only the last of these escaped an assassin’s
bullet. Calles would became the father
of a new Mexican politics. The
suffering of the Mexican people continued.
Convention
of Aguascalientes
The Convention of Aguascalientes
opened on October 31, 1914. Debate
centered on who ought to be President of Mexico. Consensus developed around a neutral figure, and Eulalio Gutierrez
was named to the post on November 6. Gutierrez came from Coahuila, the same
state as Madero and Carranza.
Apparently Obregon had proposed Gutierrez to placate Carranza, but
Carranza boycotted the Convention completely.
Villa and Zapata agreed to combine forces to install Gutierrez in office
at Mexico City. Obregon was alarmed
enough by this move to leave the convention and join Carranza. Carranza and Obregon were forced to leave
Mexico City in December. They entered
Veracruz early in 1915, where American troops had just departed. There was no coincidence in the American
action. President Wilson had decided to
support Carranza as the best figure to unite and modernize Mexico. Carranza, in Wilson’s eyes, was the rightful
heir of Madero.
Villa and Zapata fell out with each
other after reaching Mexico City. There
ideas Mexico’s future were deeply at odds.
President Gutierrez, installed by Villa and Zapata, soon feared for his
life – he fled in January 1915.
Meantime, Obregon had become Minister of War in Carranza’s
government. Obregon led the army of the
Carranza government back into Mexico City.
Zapata withdrew southward, and Obregon did not pursue. Villa, however, remained dangerous in
Obregon’s eyes. In April 1915, Obregon
defeated Villa in the largest pitched battle of the Mexican Revolution, the
Battle of Celaya. Villa fled north with
the remnant of his forces to his home state of Chihuahua. Obregon’s victory granted Carranza great
credibility. In October 1915, President
Wilson extended diplomatic recognition to Carranza was provisional president.
Villa was furious with Wilson, and
found additional grounds of anger against the United States soon enough. On November 1, just south of the Arizona
border, Villa suffered an serious defeat at the hands of the Carrancistas. This defeat had been made possible by the
Carranza’s troops being allowed to cross United States territory and attack
Villa from the north. Villa planned
revenge. On March 9, 1916, Villa and 500
men attacked the American town of Columbus, New Mexico, garrisoned by the 13th
Cavalry. Eighteen Americans were
killed, but Villa lost 90 attackers.
President Wilson ordered General John J. Pershing to led nearly 10,000
American troops into Mexican to capture Villa, if possible, and to destroy his
forces.
Wilson’s reaction was exactly what
Villa had wanted. Villa was determined
to make himself a patriotic hero defending Mexico against invaders. He wanted to expose Carranza as a puppet of
the Americans who would not protect Mexican territory. Wilson selected Pershing as commander
because he was confident that Pershing would not recklessly extended a
“punitive expedition” into a full-fledged war.
Earlier in his career, Pershing had ended warfare with the Moro Sultan
in the Philippines by displaying a tactful degree of cultural sensitivity
[studying the Quran, for example] which few American military officers of the
age could have mustered. Pershing was
under strict orders in Mexico to leave the civilian population alone and not to
confront Mexican Army troops. Carranza,
for his part, ordered Mexican Army troops to give Pershing wide berth. Although Pershing did not catch Villa, he
did satisfy American indignation without provoking full-scale war.
For Carranza, the presence of
American troops on Mexican soil was a major headache. He had to denounce the United States without disrupting
relations. Fortunately, Wilson and
Carranza needed each other. Wilson
needed a stable Mexico to free up the United States for the European war, and
only Carranza could deliver. Carranza,
for his part, sought to legitimate his government by writing a new
constitution. The Constitution of 1917
was promulgated on February 5, 1917 as American troops departed the
country. The Constitution banned the
re-election of the president. Carranza
term of office was backdated to December 1, 1916, to extend four years,
although Carranza did not actually take the oath under the new Constitution
until May 1, 1917. The limitation of
the presidential term was a gesture to Obregon who complained that Carranza
showed little interest in social reforms towards which Obregon had more
sympathy. Obregon quit the cabinet and
returned home to Sonora, but the promise of eventual supreme power seemed
concrete.
The
Presidency of Venustiano Carranza
While Alvaro Obregon became a rich
gentleman farmer selling garbanzo beans to the United States government in
World War One [a deal negotiated with U.S. Food Adminstrator Herbert Hoover],
Venustiano Carranza governed Mexico. In
his policies, Carranza really was Madero’s heir. He made his peace with business, both foreign and domestic, with
the Church and with the hacendados.
Carranza succeeded in restoring the authority of the central government
in much of the country. He achieved
these results often by buying off military commanders, and forgetting the
past. But he remained far short of
uniting Mexico. In two particularly
important cases, Carranza did not succeed.
He could not end the insurgencies of Villa or Zapata. If anything, these two men had enjoyed a
revival in their fortunes in 1917 and 1918.
On April 10, 1919, Emiliano Zapata
was assassinated in compliance with President Venustiano Carranza’s
wishes. The mastermind of the scheme
was Carranza’s trusted lieutenant Pablo Gonzalez. Gonzalez learned that Zapata had been attempting to convince an
Army colonel to join the Zapatista cause.
Gonzalez ordered the colonel to set a trap. The colonel started doing favors for Zapata, including executing
certain men that had betrayed Zapata and joined the government side. Then, the colonel promised to deliver a load
of ammunition to Zapata if Zapata himself would come to pick it up himself at
the Chinameca hacienda. When Zapata
entered the hacienda to join the colonel for lunch, a squad of soldiers posing
as an honor guard opened fire on Zapata and killed him.
Carranza’s desire to eliminate
Zapata was plain enough given the course of past events and his ideological
conflict with Zapata. However, another
factor was the approaching presidential election of 1920. Carranza developed the idea of obeying the
constitutional ban on re-election, but retaining power by running a
presidential candidate who could be his puppet. In the fall of 1919, Carranza endorsed the presidential candidacy
of Ignacio Bonillas, Mexican Ambassador to the United States. Needless to say, this announcement made
Alvaro Obregon furious. The elimination
of Zapata removed a possible ally for Obregon.
From Carranza’s point of view, the continued activity of Francisco Villa
was less of an irritant. Obregon and Villa
hated each other, and the possibility of ana alliance seemed slender. In a showdown, Villa would probably prefer
to accept Bonillas.
The showdown came early in
1920. Obregon rebelled against
Carranza. The army rallied to
Obregon. Carranza fled the capital, but
was caught and killed by troops loyal to Obregon on May 21. For appearances sack, Obregon installed his
fellow Sonoran Adolfo de la Huerta as provisional president until “elections”
could be held. Obregon now had a
surprise coming. Without Obregon’s
knowledge, Adolfo de la Huerta contacted Francisco Villa to make some deal
before Obregon took office.
Villa accepted a deal. He agreed to disband his forces and not
fight again in return for amnesty and the retention of the personal fortune he
had accumulated. Villa probably decided
to get while the going was good, before his enemy Obregon was president. Huerta announced the deal in July 1920
before Obregon knew of it. Huerta, as
provisional president, had full legal authority to set the deal in stone
himself. Obregon was furious when he
first heard the news, but practical considerations led home to accept it. Huerta also made deals with other, lesser
known, revolutionaries. In his short
term in office, Adolfo de la Huerta made a significant contribution to Mexico’s
stability and order. Obregon opened his
official term as president on December 1, 1920.
The
Presidency of Alvaro Obregon
Obregon’s presidential term from
1920 to 1924 contains some noteworthy items.
He actually carried out a significant land reform, and recognized the
rights of organized labor. Most
important of all, Obregon appointed Jose Vasconcelos as Minister of Public
Instruction. Vasconcelos, a noted
intellectual, had appointed Rector of the National University by Carranza. In Obregon’s administration, Vasconcelos
initiated a policy of universal education and literacy. Although Vasconcelos left the administration
in 1923, his policies continued and were gradually implemented. In many ways, the development of education,
extensive of literacy and the universal speaking of Spanish in Mexico were the
greatest positive legacies of the Mexican Revolution. Vasconcelos deserves the primary credit for these changes, but
Obregon himself must be given credit as well.
However, the struggle for the power
in Mexico never receded too far from view.
Obregon had no option but to retire after one term – who would follow
him in the presidency? Many in Mexico
had been impressed by the provisional presidency of Adolfo de la Huerta, and
pressed Obregon to endorse Huerta as his successor. Obregon, however, had a different thought. He decided that Plutarco Elias Calles would
to be the next president. Calles, like
Obregon and Huerta, was a Sonoran.
Many suspected that Obregon preferred Calles to Huerta because Calles
would follow Obregon’s instructions.
Huerta, as he had demonstrated in the pardon of Francisco Villa, was
prepared to be his own man. One supporter
of Huerta was Francisco Villa. Villa
lived on his estate at Canutillo, Chihuahua.
On July 20, 1923, Francisco Villa
was assassinated in the town of Parral.
While Villa sat in the backseat of his moving car, shooters hidden in a
apartment building pumped dozens of Dumdum bullets into the vehicle. Villa himself was hit nine times, and
died. Who instigated the shooting? One telling point is that the Mexican Army
garrison commander in Parral, a friend of Villa’s, had been suddenly called
away from Parral with his entire force to participate in a ceremonial occasion
thirty miles off. No one has imagined
this to be a coincidence. Official
connivance, if not instigation, seems certain.
Unquestionably, Villa had many personal enemies who wanted his
death. Any number of people might have
pulled the trigger, but arranging the absence of the soldiers indicates a more
powerful hand than a mere personal enemy.
Was Obregon behind it? Or
Calles?
Frederick Katz, a recent biographer
of Villa, argues that Obregon was surprised
by news of Villa’s death, and should not be regarded as responsible in
spite of his old hatred for Villa. Katz
suggests that Calles had the most to gain from Villa’s death. Villa had gained a political following since
his “retirement” in 1920, and would support Huerta against Calles. Moreover, Obregon announced his endorsement
of Calles soon after Villa’s death.
Huerta, and many others, regarded the designated of Calles as Obregon
had viewed Carranza’s designation of Bonillas, a ploy to evade the “no
re-election” provision of the Constitution.
In December 1923, Adolfo de la
Huerta and his supporters rebelled against Obregon. Huerta made his headquarters in Veracruz. He attracted support from the business
community, middle class professionals, labor unions and intellectuals. However, the bulk of the Army remained loyal
to Obregon, who remained their idol.
The revolt failed, and Huerta fled to the United States. He lived in Los Angeles as an exile until
1936 – returning home when Calles went into exile. When the army officers who
played a vital role in the defeat of Huerta was a young colonel from Michoacan
named Lazaro Cardenas. For his efforts,
Obregon promoted Cardenas to brigadier general in 1924, aged twenty-nine
years. We shall meet him again! In the meantime, the results of the 1924
election were foreordained: Plutarco Elias Calles was elected President of
Mexico.
The
Presidency of Plutarco Calles
The assumption of many in Mexico
that the presidency of Calles would be no more than extension of the Obregon
administration proved to be incorrect. Calles
took Mexico in a new direction in one vital area. Calles launched an unprecedented assault on the Catholic Church
in Mexico. Anti-clericalism, of course,
was nothing new in Mexican politics.
Porfirio Diaz had made his peace with the Church, but when the Mexican
Revolution in 1910-1911, many revolutionaries viewed the Church as one of the
pillars of the Diaz dictatorship. For
them, Mexico had to return to the anti-clerical agenda of Juarez and Lerdo. Carranza
had inserted strong anti-clerical provisions been in the Constitution of
1917, although both Carranza and Obregon only applied these measures
selectively. Carranza and Obregon
thought of these provisions as a gun pointed at the head of the Church to assure
the Church’s good behavior [staying out of politics]. Carranza and Obregon did not intend to pull the trigger unless
forced to it.
Calles, however, decided to
implement the measure of anti-clericalism permitted under the
Constitution. In June 1926, Calles
issued the “Ley Calles” providing specific criminal penalties against Catholic
clergy for a variety of infractions. In
protest, the Mexican bishops suspended public worship in Mexico, and asked
Catholics to go on an economic strike against the government until the Ley
Calles was rescinded. Calles
responded by sending army troops on a series assaults on churches that left
dozens dead by the end of the year. The
Mexican Congress, usually a rubber stamp, registered its dissatisfaction by
amending the Constitution in October 1926.
The amendment extended the term of office of the next president [to be
elected in 1928] and all later presidents to six years. Moreover, the existing ban on presidential
re-election so that presidential service before 1924 did not count.
The direct meaning of this was
simple – it made Obregon eligible to run in 1928 and serve a six year
term. Here was a harsh slap at Calles,
but what did it mean in a larger sense?
Was this a real protest against Calles’ anti-clericalism policy, or had
Obregon simply taken an advantage of a national crisis to find a way back into
power? In any case, the prospect of
Obregon returning to power did not resolve the crisis since he was no friend of
the Catholic Church. A lay Catholic
organization called the “Liga Nacional de la Defensa
de la Libertad Religiosa” [LNDLR], with
the tacit consent of the bishops, planned to launch a full-scale armed
insurrection to open on January 1, 1927.
The rebellion came to called the Cristero rebellion after the war cry
“Viva Cristo Rey!”
The Cristero
rebellion was suppressed with great brutality.
Many of the executed priests have since been canonized as martyrs of the
Church. The original leader of the
LNDLR, Rene Capistran Garza, was an idealistic Catholic lawyer, but he proved
to be an inadequate leader. Capistran
fled the country in June 1927. The
Cristeros resorted to hiring a professional soldier named Enrique
Gorostieta Velarde to command their forces.
Weirdly, Gorostieta himself was an anti-clerical, but he led Cristero
forces for two reasons: Gorostieta was very well paid, and he thought that he
could overthrow Calles and make himself president.
In the midst of the fighting, the
presidential election of 1928 was held.
Unsurprisingly, Alvaro Obregon was elected president, but before he
could take office he was assassinated.
On July 17, 1928, Jose Leon Torral, a Cristero, killed Obregon. Obregon joined Madero, Zapata, Carranza, and
Villa among major revolutionary leaders who ended their lives by violence. By default, Calles would carry on as
Mexico’s leader, but in compliance with the Constitution he vacated the
presidency on schedule. Instead,
Congress appointed Emilio Portes Gil, a lawyer from Tamaulipas State, as
temporary president, with the premise of a special election in 1929 to fill the
remainder of the six year term which Obregon had been scheduled to
complete. Portes, of course, would
dutifully follow the lead of Calles, now known as “El Jefe Maximo,” the Supreme
Chief.
THE
MAKING OF THE MODERN MEXICAN POLITICAL ORDER
The Cristero Rebellion was the last
spasm of mass violence in the Mexican Revolution; the killing of Obregon was
the last major assassination. The
Mexican people were left exhausted, and thirsting for peace, order and
stability. Calles offered peace, order and
stability when no else could offer anything.
While the Mexican people remembered the violence of the Revolution, they
accepted the political order that Calles had created. Only in the 1960’s and 1970’s did a new generation come into
political awareness. Younger people who
did not remember the violent past, but were painfully aware of the corruption
in Mexican politics, of the lack of real democracy, of the continuing poverty
and despair of much of the population began to demand change. Finally, in 2000, an opposition candidate
assumed the presidency. But what had
really changed?
The
Maximato
A six year presidential term in
Mexico has been known as a “sexenio.”
The first sexenio, from 1928-1934, was shared by three presidents, but
they were less important than the man behind the scenes, Plutarco Calles. This sexenio has been called the “Maximato,”
in honor of “El Jefe Maximo.” At first,
however, Calles elected to fade into the background out of public view. An end to the Cristero Rebellion had to be
negotiated. Both sides realized that
the rebellion could not be suppressed, but the government could not be
overthrown either. Calles, however, was
not the man to make peace. Temporary
President Emilio Portes Gil did make peace with the Catholic Church in June
1929. An important intermediary in the
talks was United States Ambassador Dwight Morrow, a J.P. Morgan partner, whom
both the Catholic Church and Calles accepted as an honest broker. The Church could take only a little solace
from the agreement. Anti-clerical laws
stayed on the books, although enforcement returned to the sporadic form
practiced by Carranza and Obregon.
With peace concluded, the Mexican
Congress authorized a special presidential election to fill out the balance of
the sexenio. At this juncture, Calles
announced the formation of a political party, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario [PNR]. The party’s presidential candidate – Calles’
candidate – was Pascual Ortiz Rubio, an engineer from Michoacan. Former Minister of Education Jose
Vasconcelos actually ran against Ortiz.
Although Calles did not interfere with the Vasconcelos campaign, the
actual balloting was shamelessly rigged.
Vasconcelos was credited with 2% of the vote. On Ortiz’s inauguration day [February 4, 1930], an assassin
wounded Ortiz. Although he recovered,
the attempt left Ortiz shaken. Then, as
elsewhere in the world, the Great Depression gripped. Ortiz became paralyzed by the fear that country that fall into
chaos, and his own life would be taken.
Calles, frustrated, “encouraged” Ortiz to resign, and he did.
The Mexican Congress installed Abelardo Rodriguez as temporary
president, and he served out the sexenio until 1934. The failure of Ortiz and growing economic crisis led Calles to
step forward in a more active role. His
goal in forming the PNR had been not only to maintain power, but to reduce the
chances of future armed conflict in Mexico by reducing the size of the army,
and shifting power to civilian bureaucracies.
The Great Depression complicated Calles’ policy. Mexico’s labor unions were making increasing
demands. In the past, Calles had been
able to control the unions by buying off its leaders, such as Luis Morones,
Secretary-General of CROM [Confederación
Obrera Regional Mexicana]. Morones had helped Calles to finance the PNR
by shaking down employers. However, as
the Depression deepened, radical forces within the Union movement led by
Vicente Lombardo Toledano, an independent Marxist, could no longer be
neutralized by Morones or Calles.
Calles attempted to face left opposition by announcing the nomination
of Lazaro Cardenas to be the presidential candidate of the PNR in 1934. Cardenas had served as Governor of Michoacan
from 1928-1932. He had played a major
role in establishing state branches of the PNR across Mexico, but he was
dismayed by the continuing lack of real reform to benefit the Mexican
people. Recognized as the leader of the
left wing of the PNR, Cardenas saw his nomination to the presidency as a golden
opportunity. In his campaign, he put
forward an ambitious agenda of social reforms.
Calles, of course, intended to retain control after Cardenas became
president and prevent the implementation of these plans. Calles intended to use Cardenas to put a
good face on his regime towards the unions, just as he had used Portes to make
peace with the Church. Cardenas,
however, proved to be a more resourceful player than Calles had anticipated.
In 1934, Cardenas took the oath of office as Mexican President. At this point, something ought to be said
about ideological perceptions of the Mexican Revolution. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, many
observers in the United States, wanted to know how Mexican leaders stood on the
political spectrum. Calles, for
example, when engaged in violent anti-clericalism, provoked comments from
Catholics around the world comparing his actions to the persecutions of
Christians conducted in the Soviet Union.
In short, Catholics often called Calles a Communist. Calles, in response, went to great pains to
maintain close ties from American business and with Ambassador Dwight
Morrow. Senior United States
government apparently never lost sleep over Calles’ supposed Communism. In the 1920’s, of course, anti-Catholicism
was part of the American political landscape, and the Protestants who ran the
U.S. did not worry about anti-Catholicism in Mexico.
The
Presidency of Lazaro Cardenas
Cardenas did not prove to be the
pliant instrument that Calles desired.
Cardenas really intended to carry out sweeping reforms. When Calles blocked Cardenas’ efforts,
Cardenas took to the offensive.
Cardenas enlisted the aid of Vicente Lombardo Toledano, the Marxist labor leader. Lombardo tore control of the Mexican labor
movement away from Luis Morones, Calles’ man, by organizing the CTM [Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico] to
oppose CROM. Calles intended to
retaliate by organizing a coup to depose Cardenas, but when Calles held a
meeting in 1936 of his key supporters [including Morones], troops loyal to
Cardenas arrested the bunch. Here is
the interesting part: Calles, Morones and company were neither shot or jailed,
but placed on a plane, and flown to Los Angeles. When the plane landed, FBI agents took the men into custody as
“illegal aliens.” Cardenas’ government
by refusing to take back these men, left them in a legal limbo, in the
indefinte custody of the United States as “undeportable illegal aliens.”
No great personal suffering was involved. Calles and company remained comfortably housed in Los Angeles at
Calles’ expense until 1941, but strictly guarded by the FBI, and out of Mexican
politics. Certain aspects of the
business seem mysterious: the FBI agents were clearly waiting at the airport by
pre-arrangement. No less a person than
President Franklin D. Roosevelt seems to have authorized American action on
Cardenas’ behalf. Cardenas greatly
admired Roosevelt’s New Deal, and Roosevelt desired to support Cardenas’
reforms. Roosevelt had also launched
two years earlier his “Good Neighbor Policy” towards Latin America. Roosevelt wanted to shift United States
policy towards Latin America away from a policy of forced hegemony [as crafted
by Theodore Roosevelt], and towards a policy of primus inter pares.
The importance of the “Good Neighbor Policy” and the Cardenas-Roosevelt
understanding was underscored in 1938 when Mexico nationalized the property of
American and British oil companies. The
move was very popular within Mexico.
Under Spanish and Mexico law, subsurface traditionally had belonged to
the state. When Porfiro Diaz had
granted oil rights to foreign companies, many Mexicans viewed these grants as
signs of Diaz’s tyranny and his contempt for the Mexican people. When the nationalization decree was issued,
the American business community reacted with fury, and threats of war came from
Wall Street and Congress. However,
there was no likelihood of war, as Cardenas probably knew, since Franklin
Roosevelt took much secret pleasure in the humiliation of his “big business.” In addition, with war clouds gathering in
Europe, Roosevelt unquestionably thought the oil safer in Cardenas’ hands then
in the hands of American oil companies.
In the Spanish Civil War, American oil companies had sold oil to
Francisco Franco in spite of the Neutrality Act of 1937 by sending the oil
through off-shore subsidiaries.
Roosevelt always believed that business was full of people whose
patriotism was for sale.
Cardenas implemented his reform to a significant degree, as much as
possible given Mexico’s limited financial resources. Cardenas also tried to democratize the operations of ruling
party, which he renamed the Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana
(PRM). He placed the party under
control of a council with representation by “mass organizations,” including the
CTM and the CNC [Confederación Nacional Campesina –
National Peasant Confederation.
Needless to say, the success of this democratization was limited, in
both concept and execution. Cardenas
considered multiparty democracy a sure road to civil war, given the recent
history of Mexico, and believed that democratization within the party was the
only way to generate an element popular control. In the long run, the realization of intra-party democracy
depended on the integrity of the leaders themselves.
In the
case of Cardenas, few doubted his personal integrity and honesty. He was a rarity among Mexican leaders in
that he did not become rich in office from graft, influence-peddling and
“business deals.” Cardenas actually
lived on his salary. It was a sad
commentary on the times, that mere honesty was regarded across Mexico as a sign
of saintliness. Nonetheless, such was
the case, and Cardenas became admired and venerated as the “clean
president.” Cardenas also did not
attempt to outstay his welcome. In
1940, the PRM nominated General Manuel Avila Camacho to become the next
president. This choice plainly
represented a swing to the right within the party. Cardenas made no fuss at the time, and did not interfere with
Avila’s shifts in policy after Cardenas’ sexenio ended.
The
Presidency of Manuel Avila
President Manuel Avila Camacho was
the last general to serve in the Mexican presidency. Although more conservative than Cardenas, he nonetheless
consolidated the enduring gains of Cardenas’ sexenio. Avila, on the other hand, indulged no radical experiments in
social reform. He sought stability, and
the end of revolution. He removed
Vicente Lombardo Toledano from the leadership of the labor movement, and
replaced him with Fidel Velasquez, who remained leader of the CTM under 1993,
and did not die until 1997. The union
became a cooperative element in the government structure, not a source of
turmoil. Nonetheless, the government
still responded to traditional demands of labor, if only to reconcile the
unions to the change of leadership. In
1943, a Mexican social security system was created.
Avila’s search for social stability
was connected to his expectations of the approaching war in Europe and
Asia. He saw that Mexico needed to
protect itself by sticking close the United States. Six months after Pearl Harbor, Mexico declared war on the Axis
powers after German submarines torpedoes Mexican oil tankers. Avila appointed Cardenas Minister of
National Defense. Cardenas spent the
war working with United States military and national commanders in defending
the Mexican coasts. In a show of
national unity, Avila and the six living ex-presidents [Cardenas, Rodriguez,
Rubio, Portes, Calles and Huerta] stood together on the balcony of Los Pinos,
the presidential residence; a symbolic denouement of revolution. Avila also paid some compensation to the
American and British oil companies for the expropriation of 1938.
Mexicans played a limited combat
role in the war. A Mexican Air Force
Squadron, the 201st Fighter Squadron, did deploy to the Pacific theater and fly
as part of the U.S. 5th Air Force.
Mexicans were permitted as individuals to join the United States forces
if they wished. Although no exact number
is known, estimates place these volunteers at several hundred thousand. In terms of manpower, Mexico’s largest
contribution to the Allied cause was the Bracero program. The program started with the Bracero
Agreement of August 4, 1942 signed in El Paso, a guest worker program to employ
Mexicans inside the United States to relieve American labor shortages. The Bracero program should be understood in
the context of earlier immigration of Mexicans into the United States to find
work.
Before the First World War, there
had been no net immigration from Mexico into the United States. There had been much coming and going without
concern for borders or immigration laws, but since there was no wage
differential for Mexicans between the United States and their own country,
there was no demand pull. Even the
chaos of the Mexican Revolution produced no significant migration [except among
affluent Mexicans, who would not need jobs] in the absence of work north of the
border. The growth of industry in
Southern California changed the picture from 1917 onward. Concern with illegal immigration led to the
formation of the United States Border Patrol in 1924, but the Border Patrol was
spread thin and had little support from business interests or local law
enforcement. The Bracerco Agreement was
an attempt to regularize a situation which would occur as labor grew short,
like it or not.
Avila had to show his concern to
the Mexican people for how Mexican workers were treated, and the United States
worried about incidents such as the Los Angeles “Zoot Suit” riots [which had
already started before the agreement was signed]. The Bracero program provided valuable labor to the American war
effort, and most of the earnings were returned to Mexico. The program had curious aspects, especially
in Texas where local authorities had to decide whether Mexicans were “White” or
“Black” by the standards of Texas’ “Jim Crow” laws. In 1944, the Texas State Legislature passed the “Caucasian Race
Resolution,” which declared Mexicans to be “White.” For Mexico, the Second World War was a great success.
PRI
in Power
After the war, Avila reorganized
the ruling PRM by removing the last vestiges of military control from the party. To mark the change, the party was renamed again, Partido
Revolucionario Institucional [PRI], the name it retains today. The PRI nominated Miguel Aleman Valdes to
serve as president in 1946-1952 sexenio.
From Miguel Aleman Valdes until Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, nine civlian presidents served out
their sexenio, and then retired. Each
of these men was the anointed leader of the PRI. The PRI had never represented a democratic ideal, even at its
best under Cardenas, but gradually became less and less democratic. The PRI leaders became a self-perpetuating
oligarch, and the presidents were a kind of serial dictatorship. Yet, it is easy to see why Mexican accepted
this arrangement for a long time.
Anyone who remembered or heard vivid tales of violence and suffering did
not want to go back to a less orderly and less stable society. In the 1940’s and 1950’s, and even for the
older generation in 1960’s and 1970’s, it seemed obvious that stability
outranked democracy.
The hegemony of the PRI spared Mexico many of the dramatic
oscillations that characterized political life elsewhere in Latin
American. When democratic governments
indulge in radical reforms which a poor country simply cannot afford, than
inflation destroys the currency, the military seizes power, and bloody
repression comes. Chile, Argentina,
Venezuela, Brazil: but not Mexico.
Mexico had no Castro or Allende, and no Pinochet or Peron. None of the nine PRI presidents was much
more than a colorless, if self-aggrandizing, bureaucrat. None of them was memeorable or
“interesting.” Still, it is good to
remember that the Chinese expression “May you live in interesting times” is a
curse.
In 1960’s, however, Mexico grew restive, as did many parts of the
world. Students were at the forefront,
and the Mexican government reacted with harsh repression. In the Tlatelco Massacre in Mexico City
[1968], hundreds of protestors were killed or wounded. A “dirty war” against opponents of the
government continued under Presidents Diaz and Echeverria. But what was the government defending? Social order or the power of the PRI? The corruption of the PRI grew apace when
world oil prices soared. The government
owned oil company, PEMEX, fattened the party elites. Leaders no longer even tried to be discrete. When Jose Lopez Portillo retired from the
presidency in 1982, he and his brother [Mexico City police chief] had become
billionaires, although both had spent their careers in the public sector. How did that happen?
It was with a PRI president that
NAFTA was signed in 1992, as it nothing had changed. Just the same, the wheels of change were in motion. Dissatisfaction with the PRI had risen both on
its right and its left, and worst of all, within the PRI, rather like certain
Communist parties, it was not clear if anyone believed in the party as anything
but a vehicle of personal advancement.
On the left, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, son of President Cardenas, founded the
PRD [Partido de la Revolución Democrática] as a party
that sort to unite the disputatious factions of the Mexican left. To the right, chanpion business interests,
is PAN [Partido Acción Nacional]. The PAN was founded in 1939 by Manuel
Gomez Morin, who died in 1972. The PRI
had allowed the PAN to operate as proff of its own democratic credentials,
secure in the knowledge that the elections were safely rigged.
In 2000,
the PAN candidate Vicente Fox Quesada won the presidential election. Fox, a former Coca-Cola executive, was
formerly Governor of Guanajuato. The
official PRI candidate finished second, and Cardenas finishing third. As a ruling party, the PRI is finished, but
it is far from doomed. The more
far-sighted PRI leaders are trying to reshape the party into a left of center
social democratic party to balance PAN.
They will have to establish some credibility, and steal the thunder of
Cardenas and, even, the Zapatistas.
Only time will tell – but the recent Brazilian presidential election is
suggestive.
Mexico
remains a country divided. For every
Mexican who benefits from the growth of industry and free trade, another
Mexican losses out. For example, since
the passage of NAFTA, U.S. corn imports into has brought the price of corn to
U.S. levels, roughly $2.50 per bushel, but this represents a 50% price drop for
Mexican domestic producers since NAFTA came into force. Good for Mexico’s urban consumers, but what
of rural Mexico? One-fifth of the labor
force is still in agriculture, and much of the service sector is tied to the
rural society.
On point is clear: Mexico is a
developing country with profound problems of poverty. National income per capita is one-quarter of that in the United
States. Mexico’s democratic
institutions are both new and fragile, struggling to emerge from under the
rubble of authoritarianism and corruption.
Too many Americans speak of Mexico, as we often do of many nations, as
if they were simply piles of economic resources – so much labor, so much oil, and
so on – awaiting the magic fairy dust of American capital, as if culture and
history meant nothing. In any case,
given the common border of the United States and Mexico, Mexico and her
problems cannot be ignored by Americans.
Moreover, if in the development of the global situation, the United
States grows more estranged from China, the Islamic World and even Europe, then
our own good fortune will depend on the friendship, partnership and well-being
of Mexico and our other “Good Neighbors” to the south.
PRESIDENTS
OF MEXICO SINCE 1867
[this list omits brief administration contained within a single calendar year]
|
Benito
JUÁREZ |
1867-1872 |
Abelardo
RODRIGUEZ |
1932-1934 |
|
Sebastián
LERDO DE TEJADA |
1872-1876 |
Lázaro
CÁRDENAS DEL RIO |
1934-1940 |
|
Porfirio
DÍAZ [1st time[ |
1876-1880 |
Manuel
ÁVILA CAMACHO |
1940-1946 |
|
Manuel
GONZÁLEZ |
1880-1884 |
Miguel
ALEMÁN VALDES |
1946-1952 |
|
Porfirio
DÍAZ [2nd time] |
1884-1911 |
Adolfo
RUÍZ CORTINES |
1952-1958 |
|
Francisco
MADERO |
1911-1913 |
Adolfo
LÓPEZ MATEOS |
1958-1964 |
|
Victoriano
HUERTA |
1913-1914 |
Gustavo
DÍAZ ORDAZ |
1964-1970 |
|
Eulalio
GUTIERREZ |
1914-1915 |
Luis
ECHEVERRÍA ÁLVAREZ |
1970-1976 |
|
Venustiano
CARRANZA |
1915-1920 |
José
LÓPEZ PORTILLO |
1976-1982 |
|
Álvaro
OBREGÓN |
1920-1924 |
Miguel
de la MADRID HURTADO |
1982-1988 |
|
Plutarco
CALLES |
1924-1928 |
Carlos
SALINAS DE GORTARI |
1988-1994 |
|
Emilio
PORTES GIL |
1928-1930 |
Ernesto
ZEDILLO PONCE DE LEON |
1994-2000 |
|
Pascual
ORTIZ RUBIO |
1930-1932 |
Vicente
FOX QUESADA |
2000- |
THE STATES OF MEXICO